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Abstract
We model two heterogeneous districts of unequal size that may enjoy each other's local
public good if a costly national infrastructure (the bridge) is provided. We compare a
decentralized regime where local public goods are decided locally and the bridge cen-
trally, with a centralized regime where all decisions are taken centrally, under both
benevolent planner and median voter decision making. In both cases, it may happen
that either both regimes build the bridge, none, or only one does. We provide a full-
edged welfare comparison of all the possibilities. When the bridge is built in both
regimes, centralization dominates if the spillovers allowed by the bridge are suciently
high. When the bridge is not built in the centralized regime, decentralization is al-
ways preferred. We also show that, under some circumstances, it may happen that
decentralization dominates even if it does not build the bridge, while the centralized
regime does. Finally, we suggest a simple mechanism to avoid the costs imposed by
the centralized regime upon minorities: allocating decision power over the local public
goods and the bridge to dierent local constituents.
JEL Classication: D70, H11, H41, H70.
Keywords: Local public goods; Endogenous Spillovers; Fiscal (de)centralization.
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Interjurisdictional spillovers have been around in the debate about the relative merits
of centralization and decentralization since Oates (1972). A textbook example of in-
terjurisdictional spillovers consists in residents of one locality enjoying local amenities
such as parks in a neighbor jurisdiction (Bloch and Zenginobuz, 2007). It is clear that
this possibility depends on the travel distance between the two jurisdictions, which
depends on the level of infrastructures, itself a public good. This particular type of
public good varies widely across countries, as shown recently by Calder on and Chong
(2004), who report a \quantity of infrastructure" index which ranges from 0.33 to
around 500 in telecommunications, and from 0 to 3.81 in roads. Even when restrict-
ing the sample to developing countries alone, the authors report a range of 0.33 to
210.97 and 3.17, for the same types of infrastructures. Slightly lower, but still consid-
erable ranges of variation are reported for the \quality of infrastructure" index. The
relationship between quality of infrastructure and travel costs has been established
empirically by, inter alia, Lim~ ao and Venables (2001) and Canning (1998). Another
example is a multi-lingual country where the citizens may enjoy cultural goods pro-
vided in the other language. Their ability to do so depends heavily on investment in
foreign language training as a part of education policy. In Spain, for instance, each
region shares its local language with a common one (the castellano) whereas Belgium
and Switzerland are examples of countries where local languages do not overlap with
a common one. While in Switzerland there is an obligation to learn at least another
ocial language, this is not the case in Belgium. Language barriers have been shown
to create labor market segmentation (Cattaneo and Winkelmann, 2005). The litera-
ture on psycholinguistics has also long recognized the high cost imposed by modern
education systems in natives of minoritarian languages. As put by Mohanty (2009),
\The relationship between language and power makes it a world of unequal languages.
Languages of the marginalized people are treated with discrimination at all levels of
the society (:::) Languages of the disadvantaged entail disadvantages in a society that
deprives them of their legitimate place in a multilingual structure."
The analysis of issues related to scal decentralization dates back to Tiebout (1956)
and Williams (1966), although it was not until the inuential decentralization theo-
rem in Oates (1972) that the trade-o between centralization and decentralization has
been emphasized. The theorem asserts that centralization outperforms decentraliza-
1tion when the costs imposed by uniform provision of local public goods are outweighed
by the benets from internalizing spillovers.1 Oates' assumption of policy uniformity
has been challenged often by the literature due to its ad hoc nature. Recent con-
tributions put politics and institutions at the heart of the debate, taking a political
economy viewpoint.2 In Besley and Coate (2003), centralized decision is undertaken
by an assembly of locally elected representatives. They analyze both a cooperative
and non-cooperative legislature. Under the latter, the minimum winning coalition is
the representative of one of the jurisdictions, who then tilts public good provision in
favor of her own jurisdiction. In addition, both constituents have equal a priori prob-
abilities of holding oce, hence there is policy uncertainty involved. A cooperative
legislature, in turn, delegates decision making to public good lovers, thus leading to
over-provision in the centralized regime. Some recent papers, like Dur and Roelfsema
(2005) and Schnellenbach et al. (2010), use Besley and Coate's approach to study
cost sharing and the decision to centralize in direct and representative democracies,
respectively. A recent paper by Koethenbuerger (2008) revisits the standard Oates's
argument using benevolent governments and iso-elastic preferences for public con-
sumption. Interestingly, he shows that the relative advantage of centralization need
not be monotonic in the degree of spillovers. However, this argument never changes
the bottom line of the decentralization theorem, i.e., there is always a threshold level
of spillovers above which centralization is the dominant regime.
This paper takes a fresh look at the trade-o between centralization and decen-
tralization in a model where the degree of spillovers depends on a distance-decreasing
discrete public project, which we call the bridge (one may see dierent languages as
cultural distance, see Ginsburgh et al., 2005). We argue that in a decentralized system
1This appealing argument has given rise to an extensive literature incorporating interjurisdictional
spillovers in dierent setups (e.g. Koppel, 2005; Rubinchik-Pessach, 2005; Akai and Mikami, 2006;
Bloch and Zenginobuz, 2007).
2For a careful survey on scal decentralization under a political economy perspective, see Lock-
wood (2006). Examples of mechanisms that may tilt the debate in favor of one of the regimes include
whether one of the government levels is more prone to capture by special interests (see Redoano,
2010, which relates lobbying to the degree of heterogeneity in the population, Bardhan and Mokher-
jee, 2000, for a political competition setup, and Besharov, 2002 for a menu-auction one), and political
agency (Hindriks and Lockwood, 2004; Belleamme and Hindriks, 2005). A recent contribution by
Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2007) models the trade-o between spillover internalization and the
improved accountability of decentralization, in a political agency model where citizens sign up con-
tracts with the political representatives under dierent assumptions about eort observability and
principals' coordination.
2local governments decide on the level of local public goods, while the central govern-
ment decides upon the bridge construction. A centralized system, in turn, allocates
all the decision power to the same government level. To the best of our knowledge,
the only example in the literature which opens the black-box of inter-jurisdictional
spillovers is Strumpf (2002), who proposes a model of learning, whereby local govern-
ments learn from each other's policy experiments. The idea that spillovers depend on
strategic decision making has been studied in the context of rms. Two recent exam-
ples include Piga and Poyago-Theotokyb (2005), who relate the level of spillovers to
rms' location choices, and Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003), where the spillover de-
pends from successfully biding the competitor's employee. Amir et al. (2003) suggest
that the degree of endogenous R&D spillovers may result from rms' location, hiring
away each other's scientists, camouaging their products and processes more or less
intensively, agreeing to choose more or less dierentiated products, or more or less
related R&D approaches or paths. We borrow from the idea that a lower distance
implies a greater degree of spillovers. Given that local jurisdictions are geographi-
cally immobile, distance is decreased through a discrete public project provided by
the central government.
We model an economy composed of two heterogeneous jurisdictions of unequal
size, where the median voters have dierent tastes for the local public good. In each
jurisdiction there is a local public good, which benets local and, possibly, neighbor
residents, in case the bridge is built. Under decentralization, the provision of local
public goods is set by the local government, while, in a centralized regime, this task
is left to the central authority. The bridge, in turn, is always decided by the central
government. Not surprisingly, the decision to build the bridge is always characterized
by a cut-o cost level. When the bridge is too costly, it does not pay to build it.
Interestingly, while with benevolent governments  a la Oates the cut-o is always higher
in the centralized regime, i.e., the bridge is built more often under centralization, this
need not be the case when decisions are taken by majority elected representatives.
We compare total welfare levels across the two regimes. The endogenous spillovers
framework generates three dierent ranges in the space of the bridge cost (which de-
pend on the decision making rule and on which district hosts the majority of the
citizens). When the cost is low, the bridge is built under both regimes. When the
cost is intermediate, one regime builds the bridge while the other does not and, for
suciently high costs, the bridge is not built under both regimes. We show that in
3the rst (low cost) range the usual insight that centralization dominates when the
spillovers (which we refer to as the bridge's quality) are high drives the results. In
the third (high cost) range decentralization always dominates. Actually, decentraliza-
tion always dominates when centralization does not build the bridge, irrespective of
whether the building costs are high (no bridge in both regimes) or intermediate (in
the cases where the bridge is built under decentralization but not under centraliza-
tion). This stems from the fact that, in the absence of the bridge, there are no gains
from centralized decision making. This corresponds to the worst case scenario in the
political economy approach. This is because the local jurisdiction holding the central
government also opts not to provide any local public good in the neighbor jurisdiction,
since it cannot enjoy it without a bridge.
Finally, it may happen that for an intermediate cost range, centralization builds
the bridge, while decentralization does not (under both the benevolent government
and the median voter setups). Then it may still happen that decentralization is the
preferred regime. This is a natural consequence of the non-optimality of the decision
on the bridge construction, which arises even with benevolent governments, since it
is decided taking into account sub-optimal local public good levels.
We also show that a centralized regime with separation of powers, in which one
local representative decides both local public good levels, and the other decides the
bridge construction, always (weakly) improves upon the case with no separation.
Interestingly, in this situation a bridge will always be built, since that is the only
way for the representative taking this decision to ensure that she will have some local
public good on her own jurisdiction.
The possibility of endogenous spillovers sheds a new light into the debate about
the relative advantages of decentralization thanks to the cases where the bridge is not
built in one of the regimes. If it is not built under centralization, decentralization
dominates, irrespective of whether it provides it or not. When the bridge is built only
in the centralized regime, decentralization may dominate in some cases. All in all, we
interpret our results as suggesting that endogenizing the level of spillovers tilts the
debate in favor of decentralization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model
and presents the optimal solution which will be used as a benchmark to the centralized
and decentralized systems. Section 3 analyzes the benevolent government approach,
while Section 4 is devoted to the political economy perspective, with and without
4separation of powers at the central level. Section 5 discusses some of our assumptions
and concludes.
2 The model
Consider an economy which is divided into 2 geographically distinct districts, indexed
by i 2 f1;2g. Districts have unequal populations, an assumption which allows us
to rank the regimes in terms of how they protect minorities.3 Each district has a
continuum of citizens with a mass of 0 <  < 1 and 1   , respectively. There are 4
goods in the economy: a single private good, x; two local public goods, g1 and g2, each
one associated with a particular district; and a discrete national public project, G.4
The local public goods can be anything from parks or museums to education policy,
while the national public project is anything that decreases the distance between the
two districts, such as bridges or roads to decrease the physical distance, or a language
education program to decrease the cultural distance. Hence, while local public goods
provide utility directly, the role of the public project is to allow for a better access of
the individuals to the neighbor's local public good. We shall henceforth refer to the
former as a bridge, keeping in mind that this can be both physical or cultural.
We follow Besley and Coate (2003) and assume that citizens' utility is linear in
the private good and logarithmic in the two local public goods.5 The utility of an
individual with preference intensity for public good  living in jurisdiction i is
ui(x;g;;) = x + [ln(gi) +   ln(gj)]; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j (1)
where g = (g1;g2) is the vector of local public goods, and 0   < 1 measures the
degree of spillovers provided by the bridge, or its quality, where  = 0 when the bridge
is not built. Note that we rule out situations where the public good in the other district
is more valued by citizens than their own public good. Individuals are heterogeneous
regarding their preference intensity for the public good, 0 <    , and are endowed
with X units of the private good (assumed suciently high to fund the implemented
3The assumption also avoids the uncertainty eect of the non-cooperative legislature, whose
consequences have been extensively studied by Besley and Coate (2003).
4As argued by Lockwood (2002), many public goods are actually discrete.
5Dur and Roelfsema (2005) and Schnellenbach et al. (2010) also assume quasi-linear utility func-
tions.
5levels of the local public goods and the bridge, if built). We assume that the mean
and median type, mi, coincide in each district.6 Without loss of generality, we order
districts such that m1  m2. Public goods are produced with a linear technology
whereby  > 0 units of the private good are required to produce one unit of the
local public good, while the bridge costs  > 0 units of the private good. A higher 
may reect the fact that districts are relatively far from each other, or separated by
natural barriers. It may also reect more distant languages (Ginsburgh et al., 2005).
For reasons that will become clear later, we also assume that   (1   )m2.
We study two distinct government regimes, decentralization and centralization.
Under decentralization, local public goods are decided and nanced locally, by a
uniform head tax levied on district residents. Under centralization, local public goods
are chosen by the central government and nanced by a uniform head tax levied on
all citizens.7 The bridge is always chosen centrally, and nanced through a uniform




g1   G (2)




g2   G (3)
in the decentralized regime, and they both consume
X   (g1 + g2)   G (4)
in the centralized one, where G is an indicator function which is equal to 1 if the
bridge is built, and 0 otherwise.8
The optimal benchmark
For later reference, let us nd the optimal levels for both local public goods and
the optimal bridge provision rule that maximize the weighted sum of utilities. The
6We are thus abstracting from distributional considerations.
7This approach follows the mainstream in the literature (see Besley and Coate, 2003; Redoano
and Scharf, 2004; Dur and Roelfsema, 2005).
8Note that G = 0 implies a spillover  = 0 and G = 1 implies a spillover   0.
6benevolent social planner solves
max
g1;g2











m1 + (1   )m2 
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These provision levels simply reect the usual trade-o between the marginal benet
and the marginal cost of providing one more unit of the public good. Note that the
local public good is at least as high in district 1 than in district 2 if and only if
m1  (1   )m2: there is a trade-o between scale and taste for the public good.
If the district with a low public good preference is suciently more populated, then
it is optimal to provide it with a higher public good level. This is a straightforward
consequence of Samuelson's rule. We rule out this possibility in our analysis.
Assumption 1.
m1  (1   )m2
Observe that this assumption is compatible with any of the jurisdictions being the
majoritarian one.
We now discuss the optimality of building the bridge. It turns out that there is
a cut-o value of  above which the bridge should not be built. Let this cut-o be











the total welfare of the economy when the local public goods are optimally provided,
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which is positive, due to Assumption 1 and the fact that   (1   )m2. Hence, the
range of costs for which the bridge is built increases with the spillover it provides.
Also, given that the bridge is built, total welfare increases in its quality. This stems
from the fact that the building cost is independent of the bridge's quality.
3 Benevolent governments and uniform provision
at the central level
In this section, we take up on Oates' (1972) approach, and model utility-maximizing
governments.
3.1 The decentralized regime
Working by backwards induction, we let jurisdictions decide simultaneously and inde-
pendently the provision of local public goods in the second stage, given the decision








The local government in jurisdiction 2 proceeds analogously, where (3) replaces (2).

















Hence, the local public goods do not depend on whether or not the bridge is built. In
the rst stage, the central government decides upon the bridge construction, antici-




































Note that local policy-makers fail to internalize the spillover eects originated by the
bridge and hence gd
i  go
i(), as revealed by the comparison of (5) and (7). As a
result, ^ d() < ^ o(), i.e. there is an intermediate range of  for which the bridge is
not built when it is optimal to do so.9
3.2 The centralized regime
The central government chooses a uniform supply of local public goods, g1 = g2 = g.
Using (1) and (4), the central government maximizes
[m1 + (1   )m2](1 + )ln(g)   g   G
The chosen level of local public good is then
g
c() =
m1 + (1   )m2
2
(1 + ) (9)
As usual, the centralized solution has the advantage that it internalizes the spillover
eect, at the cost of not taking into account taste heterogeneity. Using (9), it is














  [m1 + (1   )m2]
where W c() has the usual meaning. As expected, if the bridge provides no spillovers,












which states that the range of costs for which the bridge is build increases with its
quality. In the next subsection we discuss which regime dominates in terms of total
9This result is proved in Lemma 1 below.
9welfare.
3.3 Comparing the two regimes
In Oates (1972) and Besley and Coate (2003), if preferences are homogeneous, that
is, m1 = m2, the centralized regime coincides with the optimum. This is no longer
the case here, for the population size creates an additional source of heterogeneity
between the two districts. Hence, the centralized regime coincides with the optimum
if and only of m1 = (1 )m2, i.e., if the total willingness to pay for the public good
is the same in the two jurisdictions. If districts are heterogeneous, simple algebra
allows one to show that gd
2 < gc(). However, we cannot compare gd
1 to gc(). Indeed,
while the decentralized regime takes into account the higher taste for the public good
in jurisdiction 1, the centralized regime incorporates the fact that the residents of
district 2 also benet from g1. Hence, gc() > gd
1 if and only if
 >
m1   (1   )m2
m1 + (1   )m2
> 0
i.e, the degree of spillovers must be suciently higher than inter-jurisdictional het-
erogeneity.
The welfare comparison hinges on whether the bridge is built under each regime.
However, since the bridge gives access to dierent levels of local public goods under
each regime, the decision to build it is not enough per se to rank welfare levels. The
next two results treat each of these issues in turn.
Lemma 1. The decision to build the bridge is characterized by a cut-o cost level in
both the decentralized and the centralized regime, such that the bridge is built if the
construction cost is below the cut-o level. The cut-o cost of the decentralized regime
is lower, while that of the centralized regime is higher, than the rst best level.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Notice that the decision rule regarding the bridge construction is the same under both
regimes, and it coincides with the rst best one. Hence the threshold cost changes
exclusively due to the provision of local public goods, which diers across the three
scenarios. In the decentralized regime, local public goods are under-provided because
only the local benet is taken into account, thus decreasing the benet from building
10the bridge. Under the centralized regime, local public goods are provided according to
the average preference across jurisdictions, implying that there is under-provision in
the high-taste district 1 and over-provision in the low-taste district 2. The interaction
between these provision levels ultimately determines whether the bridge is built or
not. Not surprisingly, the second eect dominates and the bridge provides a higher
benet in the centralized regime than under the rst best scenario.
Armed with the threshold comparison in Lemma 1, we now look at the welfare
ranking across regimes.
Proposition 1. There is a threshold value of the bridge building cost, ~ , above which
decentralization always dominates centralization. When the building cost is lower than
the threshold, decentralization dominates only if the bridge quality is suciently low.
Moreover, ~  < ^ c(), i.e., it may happen that decentralization dominates centralization
when the bridge is built under the latter, and not the former.
Proof. See Appendix B.
What does this result add to our knowledge about the trade-o between centralization
and decentralization? In the classical exogenous spillover case, centralization dom-
inates when the degree of spillovers is high enough. This is also what one obtains
here for suciently low construction costs, when both regimes build the bridge. It is
also not surprising that decentralization is the dominating regime when building costs
are so high that there is no bridge in either regime (this is just equivalent to the no
spillover case). Interestingly, however, there are cases in which the centralized regime
provides the bridge while the decentralized one does not, and the latter dominates the
former independently of the bridge's quality. This is a consequence of the fact that
the centralized regime provides the bridge when it is not optimal to do so. We may
thus argue that making spillovers endogenous improves the case for a decentralized
regime. Moreover, Besley and Coate (2003) show that, when districts are identical
and spillovers are absent, the two regimes generate the same level of surplus, which is
not the case here. When spillovers are absent, irrespective of the two districts' prefer-
ences for the public good, no regime provides the bridge and hence decentralization is
always the preferred one, since it caters for local tastes. Also, and as mentioned pre-
viously, the coincidence between the centralized regime and the optimum now arises
only when m1 = (1 )m2. This is a natural consequence of our introduction of size
heterogeneity across jurisdictions.
114 Majoritarian elections
We now model political decision making, based on the citizen-candidate frameworks
proposed in Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Al Slivinski (1996). We follow
Besley and Coate (1997) in assuming that decision makers cannot commit to a given
policy platform prior to the election stage, and therefore they always follow their
preferred policies once in oce. Hence, citizens elect policy-makers whose preferences
match the ones they like. Policy preferences are common knowledge, and there is no
cost of entering the political market.
4.1 The decentralized regime
Under decentralization, the bridge construction is decided by the national legislature,
while elected regional representatives are responsible for setting the supply of local
public goods in each jurisdiction. All representatives are elected by majority voting.
We set up a four stage process, consisting of: (i) citizens in each jurisdiction elect a
legislator to the national legislature, (ii) the legislature decides whether to build the
bridge, (iii) citizens in each jurisdiction elect a policy-maker to the regional govern-
ment, and, nally, (iv) local policy-makers in each jurisdiction choose simultaneously
and independently the supply of local public goods.10
As usual, we look for a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Let the type of the
elected policy-maker in stage 3 in district i be given by i; i = 1;2. Working by
backwards induction, and recalling that elected citizens follow their preferred policies
when in oce, it is straightforward to use (1), (2) and (3) to obtain the provided level












In the third stage, citizens vote to elect the local policy-maker. Following Besley
and Coate (2003), a pair of representative types (
1;
2) is majority preferred under
decentralization if, in each district i, a majority of citizens prefers the type of their
representative to any other type  2 (0;  ], given the type of the other district's
10Considering simultaneous elections for the national and regional governments followed by si-
multaneous decisions in a second stage would keep our results unchanged. By contrast, having
local decisions before the national ones would create strategic interaction at the local level. In this
case, local policy-makers in one region can use local public goods to inuence the level of spillovers
implemented by the legislature, and these depend on the decision of the other region.
12representative j; j 6= i. Using (1) and (2), a citizen of type  in district 1 enjoys a













  1   G
As these preferences are clearly single-peaked, the median voter theorem implies that
the elected pair is (m1;m2), thus local public good provision coincides with the tra-
ditional approach and is given by (7).
Let us now look at the bridge construction stage. At this point, it is necessary
to dene the rules of how the legislature behaves. There is no unied approach in
the literature, although a number of dierent alternatives have been suggested (see
Lockwood, 2006). Here, we will use a slightly modied version of the closed rule
legislative bargaining proposed in a seminal paper by Baron and Ferejohn (1989),
and used in Besley and Coate (2003). In stage 2, the legislature makes a proposal
regarding whether the bridge should be built, which must then nd the support of
a minimum coalition. In our two jurisdiction model, the minimum winning coalition
is the representative of the jurisdiction with the greatest mass of residents. In the
rst stage, citizens in each jurisdiction elect the legislator who will take part in the
national legislature. As the representative which sets the policy is the one from the
most populated district, it is straightforward to show that the median voter of this
jurisdiction will be the decision taker at the national level. When district 1 is the




















yielding a cut-o cost level of
^ 





where the superscript pd1 stands for the political economy decentralized regime, when
the median voter of jurisdiction 1 is the decision maker.
Given that the local public good levels coincide both under the traditional and
the political economy approach, the dierence in the cut-o bridge costs is due to
13the dierent decision rule. It is instructive to understand the dierences between this
cut-o cost level and ^ d. Firstly, the median voter benets from the bridge but does
not bear its full cost, while the planner takes into account the full bridge cost when
deciding upon construction. Secondly, the impact of the bridge on the residents of
district 2 is ignored. The rst eect leads ^ pd1 to be higher, while the second eect
leads it to be smaller, than ^ d, so we cannot compare the two, a priori. The two
eects clearly appear when we compute the dierence between the two cut-o cost
levels
^ 
pd1   ^ 












Analogously, when district 2 is the majoritarian district
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and the same two eects are present, so that we cannot a priori compare ^ pd2 with
^ d.
4.2 The centralized regime
Under centralization, both local public goods and the bridge construction are decided
by the national legislature, and all costs are split uniformly across jurisdictions. The
order of events is as follows. Firstly, citizens in each jurisdiction elect a representative
(delegate) among them, by majority voting. Thereafter, the legislature chooses the
policy vector. Again, it is a straightforward exercise to show that the median voter of
the most populated district will decide the policy vector. The provided level of local

































14otherwise. Clearly, the own jurisdiction local public good is higher in the centralized
regime because the cost is shared equally across the two jurisdictions, i.e., the median
voter of, say, district 1, pays g1 here and g1= in the decentralized regime. Secondly,
the decision-maker decides the amount of public good in the neighbor jurisdiction as
well, which naturally depends on the bridge quality. This eect compounds with the
above common pool one, so that we cannot a priori rank public good levels in the
neighbor jurisdiction across the two regimes. A third eect stems from the dierent
preferences reected in the decision about the local public good. Not surprisingly,
it takes a sucient quality, relative to the common pool eect and the preference
heterogeneity, for the local public good in the neighbor jurisdiction to be higher in









1 ; i = 1;2 when  > m1=m2. The interested reader will note that Besley and
Coate's (2003) uncertainty eect is not present here, due to our assumption of unequal
jurisdiction sizes. However, our framework borrows from theirs the misallocation and
common pool eects, which drive our analysis.
The ranking of the neighbor local public goods determines the decision about the
bridge. If district 1 is the majoritarian one, using (1) and (4), the median voter









































4.3 Comparing the two regimes
As with the benevolent planner case, the welfare dierence across the two regimes
hinges on two factors: rstly, whether or not the bridge is built and, secondly, the
dierent local public good levels under each scenario. While it is possible to compare
15the cut-o costs with the rst best one, the exercise is less instructive here, for the
decision about the bridge construction now follows a dierent rule (which is not the
case with the benevolent planner approach). We therefore proceed by comparing the
cut-o cost levels across the two regimes. Figure 1 displays the comparison of the two
cut-o levels in the (;m1=m2) space. Its main ndings are summarized in Lemmas
2 and 3.
Lemma 2. When the high-taste district is majoritarian, the decision to build the
bridge is characterized by a cut-o cost level. The cut-o cost level under centralization
is always lower than that of the decentralized regime, except when districts are very
heterogeneous (or district 1 is suciently more populated) and the bridge quality is
suciently high.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition for this result is quite simple. The benet of the bridge in both regimes
is related to the level of local public good in jurisdiction 2. In the centralized regime
building the bridge implies providing some public good in jurisdiction 2, which entails
a cost since the budget is centralized. This cost is outweighed by the benet only
when the public good in jurisdiction 2 is suciently higher in the centralized regime
than in the decentralized one: that requires both a high degree of spillovers and a high
public good taste of 1's median voter vis-a-vis that of 2's (or a suciently populated
district 1). These eects explain the cut-o bridge quality above which the centralized





We now look at the case where the majority lives in district 2.
Lemma 3. When the low-taste district is majoritarian, the decision to build the bridge
is characterized by a cut-o cost level. The cut-o cost level under centralization
is always lower than that of the decentralized regime, except when districts are not
too heterogeneous, district 2 is suciently more populated, and the bridge quality is
suciently high.











A ^ pc2() < ^ pd2() when  <
m1e
m2
B ^ pc2() < ^ pd2() for all 
C ^ pc1() < ^ pd1() for all 
D ^ pc1() < ^ pd1() when  <
(1 )m2e
m1
Figure 1: Ranking of cut-o levels for the bridge cost,
 
^ pdi(); ^ pci()

; i = 1;2:
The reasoning here is analogous to Lemma 2, except that the local public good in
jurisdiction 1 is suciently high to overcome the increased cost under centralization
when the bridge quality is high enough and the preference of district 2's median voter
is suciently high, that is, districts are not too heterogeneous. The combination of





Figure 1 also highlights an interesting contrast between the two cases. While when
district 1 is the majoritarian one, there exists a  above which ^ pc1 > ^ pd1 for all
possible values of , this is not true when district 2 is majoritarian. When  > 1=e, we
always have ^ pc2 < ^ pd2, irrespective of the degree of spillovers created by the bridge.
This is a natural consequence of the high local public good provided in jurisdiction 1
under the decentralized regime when  gets suciently close to 1=2.
Armed with the threshold comparison in Lemmas 2 and 3, we may now address
the welfare comparison across the two regimes. We tackle this issue in two separate
propositions.
Proposition 2. Decentralization dominates centralization when
(i) both regimes build the bridge and the degree of spillovers provided by the bridge
is not too high;
(ii) the centralized regime does not build the bridge.
17Proof. See Appendix E.
When the bridge is built under the two regimes, one nds a similar result to the tra-
ditional approach one, namely, that centralization dominates when the bridge is su-
ciently good. While the decentralized provision of local public goods coincides under
both the traditional and the political economy approach, the centralized one is very
dierent across the two decision rules. However, it is still true that spillovers are taken
into account, albeit for dierent reasons. Here, the median voter of the majoritarian
jurisdiction decides upon the level of local public good in the neighbor jurisdiction,
which she can enjoy only if the bridge is built. However, the own-jurisdiction local
public good provision does not vary with the level of spillovers. It is also interesting
to note that preference heterogeneity is not reected in the local provision in the po-
litical economy setup, as much as in the traditional approach. Again, this happens
for a very dierent reason. Instead of a benevolent planner obeying a constitutional
rule of uniform provision, we have the majority deciding the local public good of the
minority according to the tastes of the former. Majoritarian elections are thus a way
to introduce the same eects that we nd in the traditional approach  a la Oates, while
escaping the ad hoc assumption of uniform provision.11
The outcome where the bridge is not built under the centralized system performs
very badly in terms of welfare. This is because the majority will only provide any
public good in the minoritarian jurisdiction if there is a bridge that allows the majority
to enjoy it. Hence, with no bridge the minority nds itself with no local public good
and no possibility to enjoy the neighbor's. While it can be argued that this sharp
result is due to the logarithmic assumption, which drives the payo of the minoritarian
jurisdiction to an arbitrarily large negative value, the intuition is very clear and it is
obvious that any utility function would allow us to build a very strong case against
centralization when this regime decides not to build the bridge.
The above proposition treats all possible cases when the bridge quality is below the
thresholds dened in (12) and (13). Should the bridge quality be above the thresholds,
however, there is an intermediate range of bridge costs for which the bridge is built
under centralization and not decentralization. Such cases are the object of the next
proposition. Note, however, that when  > pci; i = 1;2, the centralized regime does
not provide the bridge, and the above result that decentralization dominates applies.
11As Besley and Coate (2003) have also pointed out.
18Proposition 3. When only the centralized regime builds the bridge, if the low-taste
district is majoritarian, decentralization never dominates. If the high-taste district is
majoritarian, then decentralization dominates centralization except, possibly, if dis-
tricts are sucienty homogeneous.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Let us start with the case where district 2 is majoritarian. What is the impact,
for the welfare of district 2, of going from the centralized regime with a bridge to
the decentralized one without? On the one hand, the local public good is higher
under the former, due to the common pool eect. On the other hand, this comes at
a cost (increased local public good and bridge bill). However, the median resident
of this jurisdiction decides to build the bridge precisely because its benet pays the
increased cost. Hence, only the own-local public good eect remains, and it is actually
straightforward to show that, even in the worst case scenario where the bridge costs
^ pc2, district 2's residents gain  (1 )m2 ln(1 ) when going from the decentralized
to the centralized regime. And what about district 1? Firstly, the local public good
is higher under centralization, given that the bridge quality is very high (otherwise
the situation where only the centralized regime provides the bridge never arises).
Secondly, there is the possibility to cross the bridge and enjoy the local public good
in district 2. Thirdly, the total scal bill changes, but not proportionally to the
public good increase, due to the common pool of the centralized budget. On the
other hand, the benet that the median voter of jurisdiction 2 derives from the bridge
(m2 ln(m2=)) is lower than the one derived by the district 1's median resident
(m1 ln(m2=)). In other words, the willingness to pay for the bridge is higher for
this latter, explaining why she enjoys a higher welfare level in the centralized regime,





















which is positive, noticing that the second term is always higher than the last (in
absolute terms).12
12Please refer to Appendix F and, in particular, (21).
19It is now easier to understand why this need not be the case when the majority
lives in district 1. While it is still true that this district's residents gain from moving
into a centralized system, district 2's residents need not have a higher willingness to
pay for the bridge. They value the bridge at m2 ln(m1=), while the district 1's
residents value it at m1 ln(m1=), two values which cannot, a priori, be ranked.
Centralization may dominate if districts are suciently homogeneous, i.e., when dis-
trict 2's residents have a strong preference for the public good. To understand why,
notice that when the bridge quality is suciently high that the bridge is built under
centralization, but not decentralization, then it is also true that the local public good
in district 2 is higher in the centralized regime. Given the quality of the bridge and
m1's high taste for the public good, she ends up providing a higher local public good
in jurisdiction 2 than what m2 would do herself. From the viewpoint of jurisdiction
2's residents, centralization has two advantages: (i) it provides a higher level of local
public good, and (ii) it allows them to enjoy the neighbor jurisdiction's public good
since a bridge is provided in the centralized regime. This is all the better news for
district 2's residents the more they enjoy the public good, that is, the higher is m2.
4.4 Centralization with separation of powers: protecting mi-
norities
It has been recognized in the literature that the minimum winning coalition view of
legislative decision-making is the exception rather than the rule (Besley and Coate,
2003). In reality, most economies organize decision-making under less radical deci-
sion rules, which usually imply some sort of separation of powers among the distinct
members that compose the legislature. We now modify our setup and suppose that,
in the centralized regime, one of the local representatives decides upon local public
good provision, whereas the other takes the decision regarding the bridge.
It is again a straightforward exercise to show that the median voter is pivotal
in each jurisdiction. Suppose that the local representative of district 1 decides local
public good provision. Then, local public goods are given by (11). When the local
representative of the other district is called upon to take the decision regarding the













  (m1 + m1 )     m2 ln(0)   m1
20from which it is obvious that the bridge is always built. This happens because if
the representative of district 2 decides against the bridge construction, then she nds
herself with no local public good. Hence, it is always in her interest to build the
bridge so as to give the right incentives to the representative of district 1 to provide a
positive level of public good in her jurisdiction. Naturally, this happens also when the
roles are reversed, i.e., when the representative of jurisdiction 2 decides local public
goods and that of jurisdiction 1 decides upon the bridge construction. This allows us
to state our next result.
Proposition 4. In a centralized system with separation of powers, the bridge is built
for any nite building cost. A centralized regime with separation of powers weakly
dominates that with no separation, in terms of total welfare.
Proof. The rst part follows from the discussion above. As regards the second part,
notice that when the bridge is built in both regimes, then total welfare is the same in
both. However, when the bridge is built under separation and not under no separation,
total welfare is innitely low in this latter, for the residents of the minority jurisdiction
nd themselves with no local public good.
The message here is clear. If the regime is to be centralized, then it should allocate
dierent decisions to dierent constituents. This system enables the minority to eec-
tively force the majority to build some positive level of public good in the minoritarian
district. It is actually a very simple and powerful device against the very negative
welfare outcome of the centralized regime (with no separation of powers) when the
bridge cost is high enough such that this latter is not built. How does this separation
of powers scenario compare with decentralization? Proposition 3 and the rst part
of Proposition 2 apply straightforwardly, since they refer to situations in which the
centralized regime without separation of powers builds the bridge, hence attaining the
same welfare level as with separation. Hence, we have that decentralization dominates
when it builds the bridge and its quality is low, or when it does not, if the high-taste
district is majoritarian and districts are suciently heterogeneous.
5 Conclusion
This paper highlights how endogenizing the level of spillovers changes our usual wis-
dom about the trade-o between centralization and decentralization. The spillovers
21are provided by a national public good (the bridge) which decreases the (geographical
or cultural) distance between two heterogeneous districts, which can be built at a cost.
Depending on the exogenous quality of the bridge, the residents of a given district
may enjoy a lower or higher share of the neighbor's local public good.
We analyze both a traditional benevolent government  a la Oates with the require-
ment of uniform provision at the central level, and a political economy setting where
decisions are taken by majoritarian elections. The endogenous spillovers framework
generates three dierent ranges in the space of the bridge cost (which depend on the
decision making rule and on which district hosts the majority of the citizens). When
the cost is low, the bridge is built under both regimes. When the cost is intermediate,
one regime builds the bridge while the other does not and, for suciently high costs,
the bridge is not built under both regimes. We show that in the rst (low cost) range
the usual insight that centralization dominates when spillovers are high drives the
results. In the third (high cost) range decentralization always dominates.
In the intermediate cost range, it depends on which regime builds the bridge. In
the traditional approach, it is always centralization that builds it, and decentralization
dominates when the bridge cost is above a certain threshold. This is because building
the bridge is costly, and there are cases in which the centralized regime builds the
bridge while it is not optimal to do so, i.e., the benets are outweighed by the building
cost. In the political economy approach, if the centralized regime is not providing the
bridge, we obtain the worst possible global welfare, for the minoritarian district nds
itself with no local public good (the majority does not provide it with no bridge
to enjoy it), and no possibility to enjoy the majoritarian district's one. When it
is the centralized regime that provides the bridge, then it may still happen that
decentralization is preferred when the majority of the population resides in the high-
taste district. Finally, we show that the very negative outcome under the centralized
regime can be overcome by a simple, yet very powerful, mechanism: separation of
powers. Allocating the decision right over the bridge construction to the minority
ensures that the bridge is always built and that they no longer nd themselves in the
no-own public good, no-bridge scenario.
Our results were obtained using a number of standard assumptions: quasi-linear
utility function and provision costs measured in units of the num eraire. More impor-
tantly, we have assumed that the benet provided by local public goods is logarithmic.
While some intermediate steps in our results would be possible to obtain under a gen-
22eral utility function (some comparisons of local public good levels and threshold bridge
costs), the full-edged welfare comparison we provide would not be possible to obtain.
Finally, the logarithmic utility has the nice property that zero provision drives the
utility to an arbitrarily large negative level. This, combined with the quasi-linear
assumption, generates a quite pessimistic scenario regarding the welfare cost that the
majority may impose upon the minority when it concentrates all the decision power.
Finally, we assume that the quality of the bridge is exogenous and that the provision
costs are invariant with the decision regime. While the latter assumption is just a
natural one to make to confer neutrality to our model, the former is a natural direction
for future research.
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25Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 1
Remember that ^ o(0) = ^ d(0) = ^ c(0) = 0. We now show that d(^ o() ^ d())=d >
0;  > 0 and d(^ o()   ^ c())=d < 0;  > 0, which proves the result.
For the rst part, use (6) and (8) to obtain
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m1 + (1   )m2 

which is non-negative, given Assumption 1. Hence, () < 0;  < 1, which proves the
result.
B Proof of Proposition 1
We divide the proof in several steps.
(i) Consider rst that  > ^ c(), that is, the bridge is not built in both regimes.
26The welfare comparison boils down to
W
d(0)   W
c(0) = m1 ln
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
Let m1 = a and (1   )m2 = b  a and notice that, when a = b, W d(0)  
W c(0) = 0. Furthermore,
d
 
W d(0)   W c(0)

da
= ln(2a)   ln(a + b) > 0
Hence, W d(0)   W c(0)  0.
(ii) Consider now that  < ^ d(), so that both regimes build the bridge. The welfare
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which is strictly smaller than 0, as shown in Appendix A. Finally, after straight-
forward simplication, one obtains
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b2 = 4 > e
This shows that there is a threshold value of  above which centralization dom-
inates decentralization.
(iii) The nal case is for intermediate values ^ d()    ^ c(). In this case, the
welfare dierence is equal to W d(0)   W c() + . Firstly, note that W d(0)  
27W c(0) +  > 0, using (i) above. Secondly,
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Consider now  = 1, and suppose that  = ^ d(). Hence,
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where the inequality follows from (ii). Analogously, for  = ^ c(),
W
d(0)   W





Hence, there is a threshold value ~  < ^ c() such that W d(0)   W c(1) +  >
0; 8 > ~ . We have that, for  > ~ , W d(0)   W c() +  > 0; 8. For lower
values of , there is a threshold value of  above which centralization dominates.
This threshold is increasing in .
C Proof of Lemma 2
It is straightforward to obtain
^ 










which is greater than 0 if and only if  > e(1   )m2=m1. Notice that this threshold
is above 1 when m1=((1   )m2) < e, in which case ^ pc1()   ^ pd1()  0; 8.
D Proof of Lemma 3
It is straightforward to obtain
^ 










28which is greater than 0 if and only if  > em1=m2. Notice that this threshold is
above 1 when m1=m2 > e 1, in which case ^ pc2()   ^ pd2()  0; 8.
E Proof of Proposition 2
Let us consider rst the case where district 1 is majoritarian.
(i) When both regimes build the bridge, total welfare (excluding the provision cost
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(14)
Firstly, note that lim!0 W pc1() =  1. Hence W pd1(0) > W pc1(0). Now,
d
 









+(1   )m2 ln +
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 2[(1   )m2   m1 ]
which is positive (resp., negative) for  < ~  = (1   )m2=(m1) (resp.,  > ~ ).
Also,  (~ ) = [m1 + (1   )m2]ln() + m1(1   2) < 0, given  > 1=2. Hence,
() < 0; 8.
29Finally, let us show that W pd1 (1)   W pc1 (1) < 0.
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Straightforward computations allow one to show that (15) is decreasing in .
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(16)
which is a decreasing function of m1. Setting m1 to its lowest possible value,
m1 = m2, (16) is equal to m2[1 ln(4)] < 0. Hence, (15) is always negative, and
there exists a value of  above which centralization dominates decentralization.
(ii) Whenever the centralized regime does not build the bridge, W pc1(0) !  1,
hence decentralization dominates.
We now address the case when district 2 is majoritarian.
(i) When both regimes build the bridge, total welfare (excluding the provision cost
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30Firstly, notice that lim!0 W pc2() =  1 and hence W pd2(0) > W pc2(0). Now,
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which is positive (resp., negative) for  < ~  = m1=[(1   )m2] (resp.,  > ~ ).
Also,  (~ ) = [m1+(1 )m2]ln(1 ) m2(1 2) < 0. Hence, () < 0; 8.
Let  = m1=m2 < ~ . We now show that W pd2()   W pc2() < 0, which
implies that there exists a critical value of  between 0 and  < ~  above which






1 + (1   )m2
2
m2
ln(1   ) + m2
which is a decreasing function of m1. Setting m1 to its lowest value, m1 = m2,
the expression boils down to m2[(2 + 1   )  ln(1   ) + ] which is negative
for  < 1=2. This shows that W pd2()   W pc2() < 0; 8m1 > m2.
(ii) Whenever the centralized regime does not build the bridge, W pc2() !  1,
hence decentralization dominates.
F Proof of Proposition 3
Let us consider rst that district 1 is majoritarian. Then, the case where the central-
ized system builds the bridge, while the decentralized one does not, may only happen
for  > e(1   )m2=m1, and  2 (^ pd1(); ^ pc1()). Firstly, notice that welfare with
decentralization is given by
W
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31whereas welfare with centralization is given by (14). Hence, W pd1(0) > W pc1()   
if and only if  > ~ , where ~  is dened as
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+ (1   )m2 lnm1 
  (1   )m1 ln(m1 ) + (1   )(m1   m2)ln
(17)
and,
~    ^ 
pd1 =  m1 ln + (1   )(m2   m1)+





+ (1   )m2 lnm1+





+ (1   )(m1   m2)ln
(18)
from which it is obvious that 9 ^ pc1 such that ~  < ^ pc1; 8 < ^ pc1 and 9 ^ pd1 such that
~  > ^ pd1; 8 > ^ pd1.
We need to make sure that (a) ^ pd1 < ^ pc1, (b) ^ pd1 > 0, and ^ pc1 > 0, and nally,
(c) ^ pd1 < (1   )m2, and ^ pc1 < (1   )m2. We tackle each of these in turn:
(a) Follows straightforwardly from the fact that the dierence between the right-











pc1   ^ 
pd1 > 0
(b) Notice that when  = 0, ~    ^ pc1 !  1 and ~    ^ pd1 !  1, which ensures
that ^ pc1 > 0 and ^ pd1 > 0.
32(c) We now show that ^ pc1 < (1 )m2, and ^ pd1 < (1 )m2 for suciently high m2.
We begin by looking at the dierence between ~  and ^ pc1 when  = (1   )m2,































where we have used the fact that  > (1   )m2e=m1 ) m1 > (1   )m2e.
Letting m2 vary between 0 and m1, (19) varies between  1 and





  (1   )m1 ln(1   ) > 0
We now look at the dierence between ~  and ^ pd1 when  = (1   )m2,











  m1    m1 ln
(20)

















where we have used the fact that  > (1   )m2e=m1 ) m1 > (1   )m2e.
Letting m2 vary between 0 and m1, (20) varies between  1 and
















33where we have used the fact that  > (1   )m2e=m1 )  > (1   )e when
m1 = m2.
Let us consider now that district 2 is majoritarian. In this situation,  > em1=m2 =
~ , and  2 (^ pd2(); ^ pc2()). Notice that ~  < 1 if and only if m1 < m1 = m2=(e).
Firstly, notice that welfare levels (excluding the provision cost of the bridge, if
built) in both regimes are given by
W





































  (m2 + m2 )
Hence, W pd2(0) > W pc2()    if and only if  > ~ , with ~  dened as

















We now show that ~  > ^ pc2(), which implies that W pd2(0) < W pc2()    under
all relevant parameter values. Straightforward simplication allows one to write ~   
^ pc2() as
















which is an increasing function of m1, given  > em1=m2. Setting m1 = m2, the
expression boils down to
 (1   )m2 ln(1   ) + m2 ln(=)   m2 ln()
which is always positive for the relevant values of  and for  < 1=2.
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